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Commentary
DOES THE OBSERVER HAVE AN
EFFECT?: AN ANALYSIS OF THE USE
OF THE DIALOGUE METAPHOR IN
CANADA'S COURTS©
RICHARD HAIGH* & MICHAEL SOBKIN*"
In "Charter Dialogue Revisited-Or 'Much Ado
About Metaphors,"' it is noted that the original idea
behind the dialogue metaphor was simply to describe
Canada's constitutional structure. Despite this, the
metaphor has been criticized for having normative
content and influencing courts and legislatures. In this
commentary, the authors analyze all Supreme Court of
Canada and lower court uses of the dialogue metaphor
and conclude that, with some exceptions, the courts
have
employed the metaphor
properly, i.e.,
descriptively. Since, however, the metaphor can be
misapplied-used other than to describe or explain the
relationship between the courts and legislatures in
Canada-the authors recommend ending its use in
judicial decisions.

Dans , Charter Dialogue Revisited ,' (Refonte du
dialogue sur la Charte), on note que I'idde de d6part
de la m6taphore du dialogue consistait simplement A
d6crire la structure constitutionnelle du Canada. En
d~pit de cela, Ia m6taphore a 6t6 critiqu6e pour son
contenu normatif et son influence sur les tribunaux et
les l6gislatures. Dans ce commentaire, les auteurs
analysent tous les usages que font de la m6taphore du
dialogue la Cour supreme du Canada et les tribunaux
en aval. Ils en arrivent 6 la conclusion que, certaines
exceptions mises
part, les tribunaux emploient Ia
m6taphore correetement, c'est--dire de mani~re
descriptive. Mais puisque la m6taphore peut 6tre mal
appliqu6e-servir a d'autres fins que la description ou
'explication de la relation entre les tribunaux et les
Idgislatures au Canada-les auteurs conseillent de
mettre fin son usage dans les decisions judiciaire.
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KERNER: Because we looked. Every time we don't look, we get wave pattern. Every
time we look to see how we get wave pattern we get particle pattern. The act of observing
determines what's what.
BLAIR: How?
KERNER: Nobody knows. Somehow light is continuous and also discontinuous. The
experimenter makes the choice. You get what you interrogate for.

-Tom

I.

Stoppard, "Hapgood," Act One, Scene 2

INTRODUCTION

There is little doubt that Peter Hogg's and Allison Bushell's idea
of institutional dialogue, proposed in their article "The Charter
Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter of
Rights Isn't Such A Bad Thing After All),"' caused a minor storm in the
constitutional law arena when it arrived on the scene in 1997. As noted
in the follow-up article "Charter Dialogue Revisited-Or 'Much Ado
About Metaphors,"'" which forms the core of this special issue of the
Osgoode Hall Law Journal, the metaphor has been discussed in
numerous court decisions, scholarly articles and reviews, political and
extra-judicial speeches, and student assignments.3 In the normally staid
world of public and constitutional law scholarship, it was a whirlwind of
an idea whose provocations continue to be felt today.
At its heart, the metaphor is an elegant, yet relatively simple,
idea: that the structure of our uniquely Canadian Charter, particularly
sections 1 and 33, allows legislatures to respond to courts that strike
down legislation as unconstitutional. The authors of "CharterDialogue"
demonstrated that legislatures usually did respond to such decisions.
They found that, of sixty-six cases surveyed in which legislation was

'(1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 75 [" CharterDialogue"].
2 Peter W. Hogg, Allison A. Bushell Thornton & Wade K. Wright, "Charter Dialogue
Revisited-Or 'Much Ado About Metaphors'
Revisited"].

(2007) 45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1 [" CharterDialogue

IIbid.at 5, nn. 9-14.
4

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the CanadaAct1982(U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charter].
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struck down for a Charterviolation, legislative action of some kind
followed in all but thirteen.5 These observations were an important
contribution to the debate concerning the legitimacy of judicial review.
Critics had maintained that judicial review under the Charter is
undemocratic because "judges, who are neither elected to their offices
nor accountable for their actions, are vested with the power to strike
down laws that have been made by the duly elected representatives of
the people."6 By demonstrating that judges do not necessarily have the
final say, the authors made it difficult to sustain critiques of the Charter
based on democratic legitimacy.7
Critics were not convinced. As explored in great detail in
"Charter Dialogue Revisited," they faulted the authors for a range of
misdeeds, including failure to furnish a justification for judicial review
under the Charterandnot recognizing that true "dialogue" cannot exist
where final authority to interpret the Charterresides in the courts. The
authors in "Charter Dialogue Revisited" respond to these and other
critiques before going on to identify a line of criticism that has been
voiced more frequently lately, namely "that the notion of dialogue is
flawed because it can be used both to support a deferential approach to
Parliament and the provincial legislatures and to defend decisions
striking down legislation."' In this the authors somewhat agree, noting
that the Supreme Court of Canada has referred to the metaphor for a
"variety of different ends,"9 not all of which are consistent or
appropriate. But, they contend, failure to use the concept correctly or
consistently hardly constitutes "a fair critique of the article itself."'" The
authors are at pains to note that their idea of dialogue was descriptive,
by which they mean that they intended to show "how legislatures did
behave-rather than how they should behave-following a court
decision striking down one of their laws on Chartergrounds."1 1 They do,
however, acknowledge now that "the notion of dialogue may also have

s"Charter Dialogue," supra note 1 at 97.
6Ibid.at 77.
7Ibid.at 105.
,,CharterDialogue Revisited," supra note 2 at 46-47.
9Ibid.at 47.
10Ibid.
11Ibid.at 26 [emphasis in original].

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL.

45, NO. I

some limited normative content" 12 and "may influence courts as well as
legislatures"' 3 in the way each approaches its work.
The purpose of this commentary is to consider whether the
judiciary has indeed misunderstood or misapplied the metaphor. As a
descriptive tool, the metaphor should be neutral in terms of the
outcome of the case and, as the authors say in "Charter Dialogue
Revisited," militate neither for nor against deference.14 To date, the
criticism has focused on whether courts are using dialogue to justify
striking down laws in some cases and upholding them in others. 5 The
critics, however, fail to explain how the courts have impermissibly used
the metaphor for these opposing ends. For them, it seems that if the
metaphor is invoked in a case striking down legislation the court should
be labelled as "activist," while if the metaphor is discussed in the context
of upholding legislation the court should be regarded as "deferential." It
is a fact of constitutional adjudication that courts will sometimes strike
down laws and other times uphold them. Both kinds of decision
constitute dialogue, and the appearance of the metaphor does not tell us
whether it is being used to rationalize the decision on the merits, which
would be an impermissible use according to the authors. 6 Moreover, the
critics, in focusing on the deference/activism dichotomy, have failed to
consider whether the courts might be using the metaphor in other
inappropriate ways. In these circumstances, we believe the time is ripe
for a closer examination of judicial uses of dialogue. To that end, we will
consider whether the courts have used the metaphor in ways not
originally intended by the authors: that is, other than to describe or
explain the relationship between the courts and legislatures in a
constitutional democracy.
Scientific experimenters and anthropological researchers can
influence the results of their studies in unintended ways. Kerner in
"Hapgood" describes this phenomenon, known as the observer effect.
12ibid.

13Ibid.
14ibid.at

47.

'See Jamie Cameron, "Dialogue and Hierarchy in CharterInterpretation:A Comment on
R. v. Mills" (2001) 38 Alta. L. Rev. 1051 at 1062-63; Christopher P. Manfredi, "The Life of a
Metaphor: Dialogue in the Supreme Court, 1998-2003" (2004) 23 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 105 at 112.
' For these reasons we take issue with the methodology and conclusions in Christopher
Manfredi's article, ibid. For one, the author declines to provide a full explanation of what he means
by all three "Directions" in his Table 1A: neutral, activism, and deference. Nor does he explain how
he decided which of these labels was appropriate for each reference to dialogue by a member of the
Supreme Court of Canada.
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Judges, as "observers" of the dialogue metaphor, are similarly
positioned: they can remain neutral observers if they only describe the
metaphor, but they can also unintentionally change a simple metaphor
into an analytical tool by being interfering observers and using the
metaphor prescriptively. Our conclusion is that judges, with some
exceptions, have correctly understood and applied the dialogue
metaphor. In other words, we believe that the authors in "Charter
Dialogue Revisited" were too quick to concede their critics' point.
In finding that courts on the whole have correctly understood
the dialogue metaphor, we do not wish to be taken as endorsing the use
of it (or metaphors generally) in reasons for judgment. Continually
referring to the same metaphor is a form of overwriting; and as we show
in Part II, can ultimately lead courts astray. Moreover, we question the
necessity and wisdom of courts using this particular metaphor to justify
their constitutional role. The simple fact is that section 52(1) of the
Constitution Act, 19827 tells judges what their role is. More
contentiously, relying on a dialogue metaphor may lead litigants to
wonder whether their rights are being protected by an independent
judiciary or sacrificed by a cooperative partner of government in an
ongoing process of metaphysical confabulation.
II.

THE COURTS AND THE METAPHOR

A.

The Dialogue Metaphorin the Supreme Court of Canada

The Supreme Court has used the dialogue metaphor in ten
cases,18 either directly, by reference to "CharterDialogue," or indirectly,
by reference to its own previous decisions relying on the same article.
These cases are listed in Table 1.

1 The ConstitutionAc4 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
'8 Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 [ Vriend]; M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3; Corbiere v.
Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203 [Corbiere]; R. v. Mills,
[1999] 3 S.C.R. 668 [Mills]; Little Sisters Book & Art Emporium v. Canada (Ministerof Justice),
[2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120 [Little Sisters]; Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnershipv. Rex, [2002] 2 S.C.R.
559 [Bell ExpressVu]; R. v. Hall, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309 [HaIA; Sauv6 v. Canada (Chief Electoral
Officer), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519 [Sauve; Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Ministerof Education),
[2003] 3 S.C.R. 3 [Doucet-Boudreau];and Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] 1 S.C.R.
827 [Harpe].
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Table 1: Supreme Court cases referencing dialogue metaphor

[ Application

Name of Case

Year

Judge(s)

Vriend v. Alberta

1998

lacobucci J. (majority)

Descriptive

M v. H

1999

lacobucci J. (majority)

Descriptive

Bastarache J. (concurring)

Descriptive

Corbierev. Canada

1999

L'Heureux-Dub6 J. (concurring)

Prescriptive

R. v. Mills

1999

McLachlin/lacobucci JJ. (majority)

Descriptive

Little SistersBook & Art
Emporium v. Canada

2000

lacobucci J. (dissent)

Prescriptive

Bell Express Vu v. Rex

2002

lacobucci J. (unanimous court)

Prescriptive

R. v. Hall

2002

lacobucci J.(dissent)

Descriptive

Sauvd v. Canada (Chief Electoral
Officer)

2002

McLachlin C.J. (majority)
GonthierJ. (dissent)

Descriptive
Prescriptive

Doucet-Boudreauv. Nova Scotia

2003

lacobucci/Arbour JJ. (majority)

Descriptive

Harperv. Canada (Attorney
General)

2004

McLachlin C.J./Major J. (dissent)

Descriptive

The last column of Table 1 notes how the metaphor was used in
the particular case. We have adopted the term "descriptive" to indicate
the situation where a court relies on the dialogue metaphor simply to
describe or explain the relationship between courts and legislatures as
set out by the authors in "CharterDialogue." We use "prescriptive" to
refer to situations where courts imbue the dialogue metaphor with more
substantive content. 9 In our view, judges of the Supreme Court have
misused the metaphor on four occasions. The results are discussed in
more detail in the next subsections.
1.

The Court as Neutral Observer: Descriptive Dialogue

The Supreme Court of Canada first cited "CharterDialogue" in
Vriend v. Alberta,2" where the issue was whether the absence of "sexual
orientation" from the list of prohibited grounds of discrimination in
Alberta's human rights legislation violated the right to equality under
9
We deliberately chose not to use "normative" to describe these cases because we wished
to avoid any confusion with the lengthy debate that continues between dialogue proponents and
their critics-all of whom use normative to describe whether dialogic judicial review is more or less
democratic and superior to legislative or judicial supremacy. See e.g. Kent Roach, The Supreme
Court on Trial: JudicialActivism or Democratic Dialogue(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001); "Dialogic
Judicial Review and its Critics" (2004) 23 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 49 at 72 [Roach, "Dialogic Judicial
Review"].
20 Vriend, supra note 18 at 565.
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section 15(1) of the Charter. The Court found the omission was a
breach of section 15(1) and was not saved under section 1. Before
deciding on the appropriate remedy, Justice Iacobucci, for the majority,
thought "it might be helpful to pause to reflect more broadly on the
general issue of the relationship between legislatures and the courts in
the age of the Charter.'' 21 It is during this part of the judgment that
CharterDialogue" is cited and discussed:
As I view the matter, the Charterhas given rise to a more dynamic interaction among the
branches of governance. This interaction has been aptly described as a, "dialogue" by
some [citing "Charter Dialogue"].

To my mind, a great value of judicial review and this dialogue among the branches is that
each of the branches is made somewhat accountable to the other. The work of the
legislature is reviewed by the courts and the work of the court in its decisions can be
reacted to by the legislature in the passing of new legislation (or even overarching laws
under s. 33 of the Charter). This dialogue between and accountability of each of the
branches have the effect of enhancing the democratic process, not denying it.22

In our view, this passage expresses a perfect understanding of
dialogue. The majority correctly described the relationship between, and
the work product of, courts and legislatures as "dialogue," and it did not
use the metaphor to justify a particular result. It simply acknowledged
the occurrence of "dialogue" as Hogg and Bushell had described it. This
is not unexpected, given that the decision came out fresh on the heels of
"Charter Dialogue," when the Court was likely eager to capture the
metaphor in its simple and elegant state. This was also the case in M. v.
H.,23 where Justice Iacobucci, for the majority, used dialogue in a
descriptive or neutral sense to explain the respective roles of the courts
24
and legislatures.
In these cases, the Court used the metaphor correctly. Dialogue
does not dictate a particular result or approach, nor does it justify
interference in matters properly falling within the legislature's domain.
Indeed, Justice Iacobucci in Vriendspecifically affirmed that courts "are
not to make value judgments on what they regard as the proper policy
2) Ibid. at 562.
22Ibid.at 565-66.

M v. H., supra note 18.
24 Ibid. at 59-61. See also the reasons of Justice Bastarache, concurring, who refers to

dialogue as part of his introduction to the case and later on in his analysis, both times in a manner
consistent with the metaphor as a simple descriptive tool (ibid. at 158, 181).
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choice." ' The use of dialogue in this context is neutral in terms of the
outcome.
In R. v. Mills,26 the Court relied on the metaphor in a situation
where the law at issue was one that Parliament had passed partly in
response to an earlier court decision. The process established by the
Court a few years earlier in R. v. O'Connor27 for the production of
documents in sexual assault proceedings had been superseded by a
statutory scheme. It was argued that the legislation was unconstitutional
to the extent that it was inconsistent with the decision of the Court in
O'Connor.The Court determined that Parliament is entitled to build on
a previous court decision and develop a different scheme as long as it is
constitutional. It buttressed this conclusion by referring to the dialogue
metaphor. The Court quoted the passage from Vriend reproduced
above and made specific reference to "Charter Dialogue." It then
added, "[i]f the common law were to be taken as establishing the only
possible constitutional regime, then we could not speak of a dialogue
with the legislature."' The process by which Parliament had responded
to O'Connorwas characterized as "a notable example of the dialogue
between the judicial and legislative branches." 9
We believe the Court correctly apprehended the meaning of
dialogue in Mills. If common law rules were inviolate, there would be no
room for a legislative response. It is the availability of legislative action
that is the essential idea underlying the dialogue metaphor. To the
authors of "Charter Dialogue Revisited," who question whether the
Court's appeal to the dialogue metaphor in Mills can be rationalized,3"
we would simply say that the Court's use of dialogue was surprising,
since there should be no doubt that Parliament can override a common
law rule; this is so even for one designed to ensure respect for Charter
values, as long as the superseding legislation is compatible with the
Charter.Nevertheless, the Court's reference to the metaphor itself was
descriptive.

a Supranote 18 at 564.
26

Supranote 18.

27 [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 [O'Connol.

2 Mills, supra note 18 at 711. Also, the Court stated that "[t]he law develops through
dialogue between courts and legislatures" (ibid.at 689).
29
Ibid.at 745.
-o"

Charter Dialogue Revisited," supra note 2 at 50.
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75

R. v. Hall 31 is worth a short explanation because it is the first
case in which members of the Court expressed disagreement over what
dialogue entails. 3 2 Hallwas a challenge to bail provisions of the Criminal
3 enacted
3 4 in which
CodeP
in response to an earlier case, R. v. Morales,
the Court had struck down a provision of the Criminal Code that
authorized pre-trial detention if it were in the "public interest."
The Court in Hall split over the constitutionality of the new
provisions. Justice Iacobucci, who wrote the dissenting judgment, noted
the Court's use of the dialogue metaphor in Vriend and referred to
O'Connorand Mills "as a good example of how this process plays out."3
For him, the legislation in Hall "demonstrates how this constitutional
dialogue can break down."' By this he meant that Parliament had not
responded to the Court's decision in Morales with "due regard for the
constitutional standards set out in that case."3 Moreover, the majority,
in upholding the provision in part, had for him "transformed dialogue
into abdication."38 The majority, for its part, felt the case before it
furnished "an excellent example of such dialogue."3 9 It noted that the
Court had struck down the "public interest" ground in Moralesand that
Parliament, after considering its reasons, had "replaced the 'public
.interest' ground with new language.""
In our view, the majority and dissent used the dialogue
metaphor descriptively. The majority correctly characterized as dialogue
the sequence of the enactment of legislation authorizing pre-trial
detention where it is "necessary in the public interest," the Court's
decision in Morales on the constitutionality of that provision,
3 Supra note 18.
32 As shown in Table 1, judges employing the metaphor were not always speaking for a
unanimous court. However, until Hall, other opinions were silent on the use of dialogue. For
example, the dissenting judge in Mills, Chief Justice Lamer, made no comment on the majority's
liberal use of the metaphor. Justice Binnie, who wrote the majority judgment in Little Sisters, did
not respond to Justice lacobucci's use of the metaphor. Justice Gonthier, dissenting in M v. H.,
made no comment on how the doctrine was used by the majority or by Justice Bastarache in his
concurring opinion.
-"R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
34[1992] 3 S.C.R. 711 [Morales].
3

'

Hall,supra note 18 at 368.

6ibid.at
37

369.

Ibid.

"-Ibid.at 370.
39

Ibid.at 333-34.

4oIbid.at 334.
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Parliament's response in the form of revised legislation, and the Court's
decision on the constitutionality of that response. The dissent correctly
described as dialogue the Court's decisions in O'Connorand Mills and
the intervening legislation passed by Parliament. Furthermore, neither
the majority nor the dissent invoked the metaphor to justify a particular
result in the case.
There is, however, one part of the dissenting judgment that
betrays a misunderstanding of the metaphor. Justice Iacobucci thought
there was a "break down" in dialogue because Parliament had not
responded to Morales "with due regard for the constitutional standards
set out in that case."41 The assumption here is that a legislative response
should pass constitutional muster. But dialogue cannot be said to occur
only when Parliament has responded constitutionally; it is the response
that is dialogue. To find Parliament's response to a decision inadequate
means the matter is returned to Parliament for further consideration.
This is a continuation of dialogue. For dialogue to break down, there
must be no response or perhaps a disingenuous response from
Parliament-the latter is possibly what Justice Iacobucci was alluding to
in this case. As long as the response is subject to a rigorous
constitutional analysis, however, the courts are performing their
institutional role. The majority did this by not showing deference to
Parliament merely because it had responded to Morales, and by
conducting a thorough analysis of the new provision in light of the
Court's jurisprudence.
The final two cases listed as "descriptive" in Table 1 require only
a brief discussion. These most recent dialogue examples show that,
despite some missteps outlined in the next section, the Court may be
back on track with its use of the metaphor. Both Doucet-Boudreau v.
Nova Scotia42 and Harperv.Canada (Attorney General)43 have brought
the metaphor full circle to its original idea as a descriptor. In Harper,
the dissenting judges simply observed that Parliament is said to be
participating in a dialogue with the courts on where to set limits on
election spending (albeit, in their ultimate view, not in a fashion that
passes constitutional scrutiny)." In Doucet-Boudreau, the majority
seemed to acknowledge the damage caused by prescriptive uses when it
41Ibid.at 369.
42

Supra note 18.

43

Supra note 18.

44Ibid.at 849.
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stated that "judicial restraint and metaphors such as 'dialogue' must not
be elevated to the level of strict constitutional rules to which the words
of s. 24 can be subordinated."4 5 Even the use of quotation marks around
the word dialogue (are these intended to suggest irony?) indicate a
change of heart in the Court's view of the metaphor. As the authors
note in "CharterDialogue Revisited," "Justices Iacobucci and Arbour,
writing for the majority, were obviously troubled by their espousal of
dialogue in other contexts .... "6 Our next section shows why.
2.

The Court as Interfering Observer: Prescriptive Dialogue

On four occasions, judges of the Supreme Court have been
overzealous in their use of the metaphor. The first hint of difficulty
appeared in Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern
Affairs) 7 In this decision, much argument was directed to the question
of the appropriate remedy should the Court find the legislation
unconstitutional, as it ultimately did. Justice McLachlin (as she then
was) and Justice Bastarache, speaking for the majority, decided to
suspend the implementation of a declaration of unconstitutionality for
eighteen months. 8 Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 wrote a concurring opinion
in which she cited "CharterDialogue" in the context of deciding upon
the appropriate remedy:
There are a number of ways this legislation may be changed so that it respects the
equality rights of non-resident band members. Because the regime affects band members
most directly, the best remedy is one that will encourage and allow Parliament to consult
with and listen to the opinions of Aboriginal people affected by it. ... The principle of
democracy ...encourages remedies that allow the democratic process of consultation
and dialogue to occur. In [" CharterDialogue"], the authors characterize judicial review
under the Charterasa "dialogue" between courts and legislatures. The remedies granted
under the Chartershould, in appropriate cases, encourage and facilitate the inclusion in
that dialogue of groups particularly affected by legislation. [A] court should consider the
effect of its order on the democratic process, understood in a broad way, and encourage
that process ......

This use of the dialogue metaphor is troubling. Justice
L'Heureux-Dub6 is, in effect, invoking the metaphor to tell Parliament
who it should consult in deciding how to respond legislatively to a court
43

S upra note 18 at 36-37.

46' CharterDialogue Revisited," supra note 2 at 19.
47

Supra note 18.

48Ibid.at 226.
49Ibid.at 283-84.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 45, NO. I

decision. Indeed, later in her reasons she states that should decisions be
made during the period the declaration is suspended, "without nonresidents' involvement that directly affect their interests and which
directly prejudice them, it may be that the decisions themselves could be
challenged as violations of non-residents' equality rights., 5' Legislation
enacted in response to a decision is dialogue, whether there was
consultation or not, and is subject to the same constitutional review as
the latter. In our view, a court uses the metaphor prescriptively when it
goes beyond recording the fact that a legislature has the opportunity to
respond to its decision and directs the process by which that response
will be realized. This is what happened in Corbiere.
The next problematic application of the dialogue metaphor was
in the dissenting opinion in Little Sisters Book & Art Emporium v.
Canada (Minister of Justice),51 a case where the administrative review
process in the CustomsAct ".and the Customs Tariff3 underwent Charter
scrutiny. The Court split six to three. The majority found that the Act,
properly administered, was a reasonable limit on the appellant's right to
free speech; the dissenting judges held that .the legislation did not
contain enough safeguards to protect expressive rights.
In light of their conclusion on section 1, the dissenting judges
had to decide whether to strike down the legislation or, as the majority
had done, uphold the declaration made at trial, which merely affirmed
that the appellant's expressive and equality rights had been infringed.
Justice Iacobucci, who wrote the dissenting opinion, mentioned dialogue
as part of his consideration of this issue:
These are not the kinds of problems that can be solved by simply directing Customs to
behave themselves. In all the circumstances, further indulgence misses the mark; what is
needed is the firm guidance that only new legislation from Parliament can provide.
Striking down the applicability of the Customs legislation to expressive materials is
consistent with the dialogue theory [as described in "CharterDialogue"]. This Court has
frequently recognized the importance of fostering a dialogue between courts and
legislatures ... . Particularly where, as here, it appears that Parliament has not turned its
mind to the issue at hand, striking down the legislation may encourage much needed
changes.54

50

Ibid.at 286.

I Supra note 18.
52

R.S.C. 1985 (2d Supp.), c. 1.

53

R.S.C. 1985 (3d Supp.), c. 41.

54Little Sisters, supra note 18 at 1257-58.
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It is difficult to characterize this use of dialogue. We conclude
on balance that it is not descriptive, and therefore improper. Justice
Iacobucci remarked that it would be "consistent" with the notion of
dialogue to strike down the legislation which would, in turn, give
Parliament an opportunity to furnish its own dialogue in the form of
new legislation containing the missing procedural safeguards. Though,
in this respect, he did nothing more than state the basic thesis of
dialogue; it is in the context of his discussion as a whole that he faltered.
Properly understood, the thrust of the dialogue metaphor is that
Parliament has the opportunity to respond to a court decision. Dialogue
is thus the consequence of a decision striking down legislation, not an
independent reason for striking it down. Justice Iacobucci said that
Parliament had not turned its mind to the manner in which expressive
rights are to be protected; that is, it had not engaged in dialogue on the
subject, and should be given the opportunity to do so. This brings him
close to saying that the desirability of dialogue is a reason for declaring
legislation unconstitutional. Viewed in this way, dialogue was employed
prescriptively to justify a particular disposition of the case.
Similarly, in Bell Express Vu Limited Partnership v. Rex,55 the
Court overreached. The claimants argued that the federal
RadiocommunicationAct56 offended section 2(b) of the Charter.Because
there was no factual record upon which the Court could determine the
freedom of expression issue, it treated the case solely as one of statutory
interpretation. In addition, the Court refused to apply Chartervalues to
the process of statutory interpretation, as it thought such an approach
should be confined to cases "of genuine ambiguity, ie., where a
statutory provision is subject to differing, but equally plausible,
interpretations."57 The difficulty with always interpreting a statute in a
manner that complies with the Charteris that it might "frustrate true
legislative intent."" Moreover, as the Court had stated in Symes v.
59 it would make it impossible "for the government to justify
Canada,
infringements as reasonable limits under s. 1 of the Charter,since the
interpretive process would preclude one from finding infringements in

55

Supra note 18.

56

R.S.C. 1985, c. R-2.

57

BellExpressVu, supra note 18 at 597.

5

8 Ibid.

-[1993]

4 S.C.R. 695 [Symes].

80 •

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

(VOL.

45, NO. 1

the first place."6 As a result, "legislatures would be largely shorn of
their constitutional power to enact reasonable limits on Charterrights
and freedoms, which would in turn be inflated to near absolute status."61
Such a development "would wrongly upset the dialogic balance."62
Although it is not perfectly clear, we believe that the Court in
Bell ExpressVu used dialogue in a prescriptive sense, namely, as a
justification for not using a particular technique of statutory
interpretation. To be sure, the rationale for limiting the circumstances in
which Chartervalues should guide the interpretation of legislation had
been articulated nearly ten years earlier in Symes. However, the Court
in Bell ExpressVu clearly was of the view that "the importance of
retaining a forum for dialogue among the branches of the government"
constituted an independent reason for holding that "where a statute is
unambiguous, courts must give effect to the clearly expressed legislative
intent and avoid using the Chartertoachieve a different result."63 This is
not a neutral reference to dialogue.
Probably the most hostile use of the metaphor at the Supreme
Court arose in Sauvd v. Canada (ChiefElectoralOfficer).' At issue was
whether Parliament's second attempt to limit the voting rights of
prisoners by recalibrating the Canada Elections Act was constitutional.
The Court was bitterly divided on the issue. Chief Justice McLachlin, on
behalf of the majority, held that Parliament had not done its homework,
and that the new provisions remained unjustifiable breaches of section 3
of the Charter.In contrast, Justice Gonthier, for the dissent, found the
legislative response to be reasonable and therefore saved by section 1.
The dialogue metaphor appears in both the majority and
dissenting reasons. Chief Justice McLachlin stated:
[Justice Gonthier] further argues that in justifying limits on the right to vote under s. 1,
we owe deference to Parliament because we are dealing with "philosophical, political
and social considerations", because of the abstract and symbolic nature of the
government's stated goals, and because the law at issue represents a step in a dialogue
between Parliament and the courts ....

60Ibid.at 752.

ItBell Express Vu, supra note 18 at 598.
62

Ibid.

63Ibid.at 599.

I Supra note 18.
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Finally, the fact that the challenged denial of the right to vote followed judicial rejection
of an even more comprehensive denial, does not mean that the Court should defer to
Parliament as part of a "dialogue". Parliament must ensure that whatever law it passes,
at whatever stage of the process, conforms to the Constitution. The healthy and
important promotion of a dialogue between the legislature and the courts should not be
debased to a rule of "if at first you don't succeed, try, try again".'

These passages, taken together, treat the metaphor as a
descriptive device, but at the same time contain an accusation that
Justice Gonthier has used the metaphor prescriptively. The chief justice
found that he had based part of his reasons on the fact that dialogue
occurred. And she was correct. Justice Gonthier states: "[S]ince this
case is about [evaluating choices and shaping values], "dialogue" is of
particular importance."66 He then went on to find the provision
constitutional. It is clear that he was equating "dialogue" with
"deference." As noted in "Charter Dialogue Revisited," a proper,
descriptive- application of the metaphor does not indicate whether
deference is required or not.67
In summary, it is our hope that with -the recent statement of the
majority in Doucet-Boudreau, the Court has returned to a correct
understanding of the metaphor. Although the prescriptive applications
of it have caused some problems within the Court itself, and led to
hundreds of pages of commentary, a renewed appreciation of the proper
role of the metaphor should reduce confusion. But what of the lower
courts? How do they perceive the metaphor? The next section of the
commentary explores these questions.
B.

The DialogueMetaphorin the Lower Courts

Our review of the lower court uses of the dialogue metaphor
covered all cases where the dialogue theory was advanced, either
directly, by reference to "CharterDialogue," or indirectly, by reference
to the early Supreme Court jurisprudence that relied upon the same
article.68 The twenty-seven cases" that rely on the dialogue metaphor
are listed in Table 2.
'Ibid. at 535, 538 [emphasis added].
6Ibid

at 577.

67" CharterDialogue Revisited," supra note 2 at 47.
6 Our list is more extensive than that contained in "Charter Dialogue Revisited." The
authors in "Charter Dialogue Revisited" were only looking for references to dialogue resulting
from a citation of "Charter Dialogue," whereas we broadened our search to include any reference
to dialogue. It is also worth noting that Jeremy Waldron, in an otherwise well-argued critique of
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Table 2: Lower court cases referencing "dialogue" metaphor"u

Name of Case

Year Jurisdiction and Court

UnitedStates ofAmerica v.
Tilley

1996

Alberta - Queen's Bench

Descriptive

R. v. Regan

1998

Nova Scotia - Supreme
Court

Descriptive

R. v. Brenton

1999

Northwest Territories Supreme Court

Descriptive

Driskell v. Manitoba (Attorney
General)

1999

Manitoba - Queen's Bench

Application

Other

courts, legislatures, and the interaction of bills of rights and dialogue, strangely states: "By the time
cases reach the high appellate levels we are talking about - at which alone the claim about interbranch dialogue becomes plausible .... " See "Some Models of Dialogue Between Judges and
Legislators" (2004) 23 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 7 at 42-43 [emphasis added]. On the other hand,
Christopher Manfredi argues that the upward climb from trial to appeal in the litigation process
should be viewed as a significant part of ongoing dialogue-the "most direct form" of dialogue. See
supra note 15 at 127-28. We agree with Manfredi. It is certainly not clear to us why Waldron's
argument should be taken at face value without further elaboration.
69 United States of America v. Tilley, [1996] A.J. No. 718 (Q.B.) (QL); R. v. Regan (1998),
174 N.S.R. (2d) 230 (S.C.); R. v. Brenton (1999), 180 D.L.R. (4th) 314 (N.W.T.S.C.); Driskell v.
Manitoba (Attorney General), [1999] 11 W.W.R. 615 (Man. Q.B.); R. v. Manios (1999), 67 C.R.R.
(2d) 138 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); Sauv6 v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [2000] 2 F.C. 117 (C.A.);
Reilly v. Alberta, (Provincial Court, Chief Judge), 2000 ABCA 241, 266 A.R. 296; Spracklin v.
lKchton, [2002] 3 W.W.R. 703 (Alta. Q.B.) [Sprackli]; Festing v. Canada (Attorney General),
[2000] 5 W.W.R. 413 (B.C.S.C.) [Festing]; R. v. Song (2001), 296 A.R. 132 (Q.B.) [Song]; Alberta
(Directorof Child Welfare) v. G.N (2002), 332 A.R. 41 (Q.B.) [G.N.]; Collins v. Abrams (2002),
118 A.C.W.S. (3d) 644 (B.C.S.C.); Condon v. Prince Edward Island (2002), 114 A.C.W.S. (3d) 921
(P.E.I.S.C.); J. T.L MacDonald Corp. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] R.J.Q. 181 (C.S.);
Mathew v. Canada (2002), 99 C.R.R. (2d) 189 (T.C.C.); Halpern v. Canada (Attorney General)
(2002), 60 O.R. (3d) 321 (Div. Ct.) [Halpern]; Harperv. Canada (Attorney General) (2002), 223
D.L.R. (4th) 275 (Alta. C.A.); R. v. Masse, [2004] B.C.W.L.D. 168 (Prov. Ct.); Highline Produce
Ltd. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union Canada (2003), 93 C.L.R.B.R. (2d) 161
(OLRB); Hislop v. Canada(Attorney General) (2004), 73 O.R. (3d) 641 (C.A.); Communications,
Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, Local 707 v. Alberta (Labour Relations Board)
(2004), 351 A.R. 267 (Q.B.) [CE.P]; R. v. Everette-Dorland(2004), 21 C.R. (6th) 225 (Man. Q.B.)
[Everette-Dorlan];Criminal Lawyers' Assn. v. Ontario (Ministry of Public Safety and Security)
(2004), 70 O.R. (3d) 332 (Div. Ct.); R. v. Thomson (2004), 21 C.R. (6th) 209 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.)
[Thomson]; Christie v British Columbia (Attorney General) (2005), 262 D.L.R. (4th) 51
(B.C.C.A.) [Christie]; R. v. Raponi (2006), 144 C.R.R. (2d) 192 (Alta. Q.B.) [Raponi]; and
Fddration franco-tdnoise c. Procureure gdn6rale du Canada (2006), 150 A.C.W.S. (3d) 348
(N.W.T.S.C.)
raThe case Procureurgendraldu Oudbec c. Confdrence desjuges du Ou6be4 [2003] R.J.Q.
2057 was cited in "CharterDialogue Revisited," supra note 2 at 5, n. 11 as one of the Superior
Court decisions. It is actually the Court of Appeal decision that references "Charter Dialogue"; the
lower court decision, [2001] J.Q. no. 2373 (QL), does not. However, the reference to "Charter
Dialogue" by the Court of Appeal is not properly a reference to the dialogue metaphor, so we
exclude that case from our list.
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R. v. Manios

1999

Ontario - Superior Court
of Justice

Prescriptive
(partially)

Sauv6 v. Canada (Chief Electoral
Officer)

1999

Federal Court of Appeal

Descriptive

Reilly v. Alberta (Provincial
Court, ChiefJudge)

2000

Alberta - Court of Appeal

Descriptive

Spracklin v. Kichton

2000

Alberta - Queen's Bench

Other

Festing v. Canada (Attorney
General)

2000

British Columbia Supreme Court

Descriptive/
Prescriptive

R. v. Song

2001

Alberta - Queen's Bench

Descriptive

Alberta (Director of Child
Welfare) v. G.N

2002

Alberta - Queen's Bench

Descriptive

Collins v. Abrams

2002

British Columbia Supreme Court

Condon v. PrinceEdward Island

2002

Prince Edward Island Supreme Court, Trial
Division

Descriptive

J TI MacDonald Corp. v.
Canada (Attorney General)

2002

Quebec - Superior Court

Descriptive

Mathew v. Canada

2002

Tax Court of Canada

Descriptive

Halpern v. Canada (Attorney
General)

2002

Ontario - Superior Court
of Justice, Divisional Court

Prescriptive

Harper v. Canada (Attorney
General)

2002

Alberta - Court of Appeal

Descriptive

R. v. Masse

2003

British Columbia Provincial Court

Descriptive

Hghline Produce Ltd. v. United
Food and Commercial Workers
Union Canada

2003

Ontario - Labour
Relations Board

Descriptive

Hislop v. Canada (Attorney
General)

2004

Ontario - Court of Appeal

Descriptive

Communications, Energy and
Papevrworkers Union of Canada,
Local 707 v. Alberta (Labour
Relations Board)

2004

Alberta - Queen's Bench

Descriptive

R. v. Everette-Dorland

2004

Manitoba - Queen's Bench

Descriptive

CrniinalLawyers'Assn.v.
Ontario (Min. of Public Safety
and Security)

2004

Ontario - Divisional Court

Other

R. v. Thomson

2004

Ontario - Superior Court

Descriptive

Christie v. British Columbia

2005

British Columbia - Court

Descriptive

Other
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of Appeal

R. v. Raponi

2006

Alberta - Queen's Bench

Fddrationfranco-tnoise c.
Procureuregdndraledu Canada

2006

Northwest Territories Supreme Court

Other
Descriptive

As in Table 1, the last column sets out how the metaphor was
applied. We used "other" to capture situations that did not fit easily
within a "descriptive" or "prescriptive" category. The results in this
section are heartening; in our view, the dialogue metaphor was misused
in only three cases. The vast majority of lower court judgments (twentyfour out of twenty-seven) simply described the phenomenon, as we shall see.
1.

The Courts as Neutral Observers: Descriptive Dialogue

Most lower courts refer to the dialogue metaphor in order to
provide background and context to their cases, or simply to recognize
legislative and judicial history. It is clear to some lower court judges that
dialogue is a straightforward reflection of reality-so much so that it has
almost lost its value as metaphor. These judges simply employ the
metaphor descriptively. For example, in Festing v. Canada (Attorney
General),7 Justice Romilly began his decision by discussing the role of
the legislature and judiciary. He relied extensively on Vriend and Mills,
which are probably the Supreme Court of Canada's strongest
pronouncements on dialogue. After lengthy quotations from Mills he
stated, "It is with these sage comments in mind that I begin my analysis
of the issues raised in this application."72 In R. v. Everette-Dorlandthe
question for the court was purely one of criminal law, dealing with
whether judicial interim release was warranted given the facts at hand.
There was no constitutional law issue per se. Nevertheless, Justice
Oliphant referred to the dialogue that occurred when Parliament
amended section 515(10)(c) of the CriminalCode to deal with specific
types of judicial release after the Court's decision in Morales.73 Justice
Corbett in R. v. Thomson74 expressed a similar sentiment when he
pointed out that "Hall arises as part of the ongoing 'dialogue' between

' Supra note 69.
72

Ibid.at 428.

73

Everette-Dorland,supranote 69 at 228.

4 Supra note 69.
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the courts and Parliament over the requirements of the Charter.' 75 All
of these judges recognized the dialogue metaphor as, at best, an attempt
to symbolize the reality of constitutional life in Canada. Only Justice
Corbett's use of quotations around the word "dialogue" hinted at any
continuing controversy surrounding the idea.
Sometimes the lower court judges are more aware of their role
in the process, but at the same time, are careful to continue using
dialogue descriptively. In R. v. Regan,76 Justice MacDonald, after
recounting a lengthy history of the interplay between the Supreme
Court and Parliament over the O'Connorcase and Bill C-46, concluded:
The case at bar is somewhat unique in that the process began by the Supreme Court of
Canada filling a legislative void [O'Conno; to which Parliament apparently felt the
need to respond, [Bill C-46]; to which I am now called upon to examine
constitutionally."7

He then continued at some length, analyzing Bill C-46 and its
constitutionality in a kind of "meta-dialogue" of his own, which
prefigures the Court's decision in Mills and reinforces Manfredi's
observation that lower courts can play a key role in the dialogue
process.78 Justice Veit had the same view in United States ofAmerica v.
Tilley,79 applying the dialogue metaphor to the relationship between
courts and the executive:
I adopt the approach recently outlined by Prof. P.W. Hogg [in the precursor to "Charter
Dialogue"] ... [where] references to executive bodies should replace references to
legislative bodies ... . The Minister has the last say, but he does not have the only say. In
the system adopted by our Parliament, including our executive, the courts have a say.
When the courts speak, they should deal with all the legal issues. Then, if necessary, the
matter goes to the Minister. Once the Minister has spoken, an aggrieved fugitive can
appeal the decision to the provincial Court of Appeal.' °

As an aside to the discussion about judges' awareness, it is
interesting to note, with the exceptions of Sauvd and Harper,the lack of
dialogue cases in the Supreme Court (Table 1) appearing in Table 2.
Part of this is due to the fact that almost half of the lower court
decisions were rendered prior to "Charter Dialogue," but that still
75
6
77
78

Jbid. at 216.
Supra note 69.
Ibid.at 235.
Manfredi, supra note 15 at 127-28.

9
Supra note 69.
' 0Ibid.at para. 15.
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leaves a significant number for which we do not have a ready
explanation as to why the dialogue metaphor is not mentioned. All told,
it seems to strengthen our argument that there is little point in judges
using the metaphor in their reasoning.
Finally, a remark about the use of the term "Other" in the last
column of Table 2. In the cases so categorized, a judge used the
metaphor, but did not make it clear whether he or she accepted its
validity, even as a metaphor. For example, in Driskell v. Manitoba
8 1 Justice Kaufman discussed
(Attorney General),
a report prepared for
the Alberta Minister of Justice by the MLA Committee. The report
referred to Vriend as an example of the respectful relationship between
courts and legislatures; without further comment, Justice Kaufman
simply remarked that this proposition is contained in the report.
Similarly, Justice Watson's view on dialogue is not clear in Spracklin v.
Ichton,82 where he counselled himself to "[be] mindful of the position
of the Supreme Court of Canada in Mills that there should be taken to
be an ongoing dialogue between the Legislative and Judicial Branches
of Government in Constitutional matters .... 83 In Justice Watson's
case, however, his view of the metaphor became clear over time. This is
because he alone, among all lower court judges, cited the dialogue
metaphor more than once. In fact, next to the most frequent observer,
Justice Iacobucci with seven citations, Justice Watson is in second place
with five citations.8 4
2.

The Courts as Interfering Observers: Prescriptive Dialogue

As discussed above., problems may arise where judges do not just
describe dialogue. The concern is that judges may employ the metaphor
prescriptively as an analytical tool to help fashion a result.
The first example from the lower courts is Festing, mentioned
above. The case involved an application by Festing for an order
declaring unconstitutional certain search warrant and claims of privilege
provisions in the Criminal Code relating to lawyers (sections 487 and
81Supra note 69.
82

Supra note 69.

8Ibid.at 711.

8 Spracklin, Song, G.N., CE.P., Rapom supra note 69. Despite his exuberance, Justice
Watson remains a proper observer of the metaphor, never once straining its effect or using it in a
prescriptive fashion. One gets the sense that Justice Watson would love to sit down with the now
retired Justice Iacobucci and Professor Hogg over coffee and discuss the intricacies of dialogue!
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488.1). Justice Romilly allowed the application in part, holding that
section 488.1 infringed sections 7 and 8 of the Charterandwas not saved
by section 1. As noted, Justice Romilly devoted a lengthy part of his
background analysis to describing the dialogic process that occurs in
Charterjurisprudence. He then reviewed the existing jurisprudence on
section 488.1, noting the conflict between the lower court judgments in
Lavallee v. Canada,5 R. v. Claus,86 and R. v. Fink, 7 before embarking
on his own reasoning process.8 ' After that comes an interesting passage:
in assessing various options for an appropriate remedy in the case,
Justice Romilly noted, "it would be more in keeping with the 'dialogue'
between courts and Parliament ... to strike down s. 488.1 ...
rather than
to attempt my hand at amending the. legislation." This is potentially
problematic. His assertion could be interpreted to mean that the
dialogue metaphor is one of the justifications for striking down section
488.1 of the CriminalCode. This would not be dialogue as metaphor but
89
as analytical tool.
Another questionable use of dialogue occurred in the first
9" This was
instance case of Halpern v. Canada (Attorney General).
an
Ontario court's first considered response to the same-sex marriage
question. At the Divisional Court level, all three judges agreed that the
common law definition of marriage was discriminatory and inconsistent
with constitutional values; all agreed that the violation could not be
justified under section 1 of the Charter. Where the three judges
diverged was on the question of remedy. Justice LaForme concluded
that the option of reformulating the common law rule should be
exercised immediately. Justice Blair and Justice Smith thought
differently. Justice Blair held that the common law definition should be
struck down and declared constitutionally invalid and inoperative, but
that the declaration should be suspended for twenty-four months to

s Citing both the Alberta Queen's Bench decision and the Alberta Court of Appeal
decision: (1998), 218 A.R. 229 (Q.B.), aff'd (2000), 255 A.R. 86 (C.A.) [Lavallee]. At the time
Festingwasdecided, the Supreme Court had not rendered its decision in Lavallee.
-6(2000), 149 C.C.C. (3d) 336 (Ont. C.A.), affg (1999), 139 C.C.C. (3d) 47 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
87 (2000),

51 O.R. (3d) 577 (C.A.), rev'g (2000), 143 C.C.C. (3d) 566 (Sup. Ct.).

88 Of course, the issue of the constitutionality of section 488.1 was later decided by the

Supreme Court in Lavaflee, Rackel & Heintz v. Canada (Attorney General, White, Ottenheimer
& Baker v. Canada (Attorney General, R. v. Fink,[2002] 3 S.C.R. 209.
89 Justice Romilly also seems unaware of the possibility of a suspended declaration as a
third option.
oSupra note 69.
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enable Parliament to correct the violation; if it failed to do so, the
declaration would take effect. Justice Smith went even further, deciding
that the suspended declaration should remain in effect for at least
twenty-four months, and at that time, if it remained unresolved, the
court could revisit the matter, only modifying the common law
definition "in circumstances and at a time when the court has the
necessary and most recent material before it to determine existing needs
and values of society." 91
The two judges who suspended the declaration, Justice Blair and
Justice Smith, both relied on dialogue. These judges arguably used the
metaphor incorrectly. Justice Smith began by quoting two Supreme
Court passages related to dialogue: Justice Iacobucci's oft-quoted
passage from Vriend that cites "Charter Dialogue," and a similar
passage from M v. H. She then went on to state:
If there is to be a proper dialogue between the judicial and legislative branches of
government, I think it prudent that such a dialogue is conducted in circumstances
where
92
the legislative framework that is under consideration is clearly before the court.

In a similar vein, Justice Blair, in discussing the remedy, noted
the Supreme Court's characterization of the respective roles of courts
and legislatures, and also cited Justice Iacobucci in Vriend.He added:
The temptation to act positively - and to correct the wrong as well as to strike it down is strong....
That, however, is not our role in my opinion. Members of the judiciary are appointed to
uphold the Constitution and to ensure that the laws of this country measure up against
the values and principles underlying and enunciated in the Constitution and the Charter.
Major changes and reforms to the law are the responsibility of the legislature ....
This approach balances the respective roles of the branches of government and promotes
the kind of dialogue between the courts and legislative bodies recently underlined [by the
Supreme Court] ...
.93

The way dialogue is portrayed by these two judges, compared to
judges using the metaphor descriptively, is telling. Justice Blair, in
particular, used dialogue as a device to bolster his argument about using
caution in crafting a remedy.

' Halpern,supranote 69 at 331.
92

Ibid.at 330 [emphasis added].

93

Ibid.at 367-68 [emphasis added].
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There is a danger in using dialogue in this prescriptive fashion.
Appropriate remedies should not be based on what the "proper" state
of dialogue is. Too many questions would arise: What "kind of dialogue"
is not suitable? How does one determine whether a given situation
should result in dialogue? How could a suspended declaration ever not
contribute to the kind of dialogue required? Is improper dialogue
related to improperly striking down legislation? Fortunately, Justices
Smith and Blair made good use of the suspended declaration of
in, alidity in Halpern. Despite the restrictions placed on the remedy by
the Court in Schachter v. Canada9"(honoured more in the breach than
actually applied), the unique nature of same-sex marriage as a legal
problem and its polarizing political and philosophical effects warrant
judicial caution. In fact, the result in that case was more in keeping with
the spirit of dialogue than the subsequent Court of Appeal decision that
held that recognition of same-sex marriages applied immediately.95
It is also worth noting that for Justice Romilly, proper use of
dialogue required legislation to be struck down, whereas for Justices
Smith and Blair, appropriate dialogue meant deference to the
legislatures. This itself is a clear indication that prescriptive use of the
metaphor is dangerous. The metaphor should point neither to nor away
from a particular remedy.
In sum, despite the problematic, applications, the good news is
that very few of the lower courts misused the metaphor. These courts
seem to understand what Hogg and Bushell set out to document in the
1997 article on dialogue.
III.

CONCLUSION

In this commentary, we have attempted to show how courts
have, in general, properly applied the dialogue metaphor. Despite the
authors' concern in "Charter Dialogue Revisited," the metaphor has
been correctly applied in most Supreme Court decisions, and (perhaps
surprisingly, given the Supreme Court's occasional prescriptive use) it
has been used descriptively in almost all lower court decisions. The bulk
of the difficulties that have arisen from the metaphor, therefore, seem
to surface in the academic commentary.

"4[1992] 2 S.C.R. 679.
9' Halpern v. Canada (Attorney General) (2003), 65 O.R. (3d) 161 (C.A.). See Roach,
"Dialogic Judicial Review," supra note 19 at 75ff for an excellent discussion on this topic.
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The debate will no doubt continue. This special issue of the
Journal probably guarantees that. From our vantage, that is fine-to a
point: there are certainly important philosophical questions about the
role of courts and bills of rights in contemporary society that are worth
mooting. Our hope is that all courts, including the Supreme Court of
Canada, recognize, at a minimum, that it is wrong to use the dialogue
metaphor prescriptively; better yet, they should see this as a good time
to move on from discussing the metaphor at all.
Because courts can employ metaphors in a way that seems
prescriptive, they may become interfering observers. Judges should
strive to stay immune from the observer effect and keep all metaphors
to a minimum, as these are literary devices not necessarily useful for,
and possibly detrimental to, resolving legal disputes. Those judges who
have pretensions to metaphor would be wise to recall Robert Frost,
who, in answer to whether he felt any affinity between his work and any
other poet's, said, "I'll leave that for somebody else to tell me. I
wouldn't know."

